Tuesday, October 10, 2006

Tuesday, October 03, 2006

Kofi Annan Will Be Missed

In Defense of Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General (1997-2006)

Over Darfur, Kofi Annan has been far stronger than his predecessor was about Bosnia or, indeed, Rwanda -- to which, of course, Annan was not unconnected himself. Annan has gone way beyond normal diplomatic protocol in chiding Khartoum and calling for international action. The U.N. reports have been unequivocal in their condemnation of Sudanese government behavior. But in the end, it was the United States that blinked and went to Khartoum with carrots rather than sticks.

If the big powers persist in speaking very loudly while carrying a very small and light stick, it is not the U.N.'s fault -- though it’s always been used as a scapegoat.

A further irony is that one of the reasons for their attacks on Annan is his success in walking the diplomatic tightrope strung between insufferable American behavior and the U.N.’s genuine need to engage with Washington and to maintain a prestigious profile with the American public. All U.N. secretaries-general have had to pander to the great powers. Annan was left with only one to pander to.

They are not attacking Annan; they are attacking any form of multilateralism, whether the Land Mine Treaty, non-proliferation, the International Criminal Court, or even the Geneva Conventions (all of which he has publicly supported). They were not even attacking the oil-for-food program; they were attacking an organization that dared to say no -- or, at least, refused to say yes -- to Bush's war on Iraq.

Lord Hannay, Britain's ambassador to the UN from 1990 to 1995, says member states are "ruthless" at manipulating the UN.

They go about blaming the UN for things that are actually their responsibility - but they go far too far in acquitting themselves.
James Rubin, a senior American diplomat at the time, believes the lesson is that any secretary general must get on with the US to succeed.

Managing the United States is the single indispensable of being an effective secretary general. It doesn't mean agreeing with the United States, but it does mean managing the United States.

It's also true that the United States does not happen to be very popular in the world right now. Since the UN is made up of member states, and most of those member states now do not happen to be very pleased with US foreign policy, you have to be able to manage this great power, but also do it in a way that doesn't make the majority of your members feel as if you're buckling under all the time."

If major countries in the world aren't prepared to do something, the UN isn't going to be able to do it either.

If people understood that, they would be less disappointed by the chief diplomat of the United Nations.
Sir Marrack Goulding, ex-Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations, assessed the role of the Secretary-General:

This is not a position of power; this is not a man who can lay down the law.

But he does have huge influence, and he has a 'bully pulpit'. He can tell the world that they really have to get to grips with whatever it might be - Aids, the environment. Kofi Annan in particular has made a great deal of that influence.

I think we shouldn't understate the importance of the role. If you put into it someone who couldn't communicate properly, you'd be missing a lot of tricks.

If major countries in the world aren't prepared to do something, the UN isn't going to be able to do it either.

If people understood that, they would be less disappointed by the chief diplomat of the United Nations.
For much of the world, it is the conservative bullies in the US who see the UN as an after-sales service complex for American misadventures. On Iraq, Iraq, Annan never buckled. When he was asked outright if the war was illegal Annan replied:

Yes, if you wish.

I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of view and from the charter point of view it was illegal.

Sunday, October 01, 2006

Disclosures by Bob Woodward

Bob Woodward's State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III

Bush 'kept Blair in the dark over Iraq'

Prime Minister Blair repeatedly complained to Bush after discovering Britain was being denied access to key information on the grounds that it was a 'foreign' nation.

The attempt to bluff the Prime Minister involved a highly class-ified database called the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) which the Pentagon used to store and communicate years of potentially embarrassing intelligence, as well as technical information about combat operations in Iraq. Woodward adds,

The classified information had a caveat - NOFORN - meaning no foreigners were allowed access, a restriction that included even the British troops fighting alongside Americans in Iraq,'
In July 2004, Bush assured Blair he had signed a directive saying the NOFORN rule would no longer apply to the British on military operations.

The Pentagon ignored it, hatching a scheme to hoax the British into believing they were being kept fully informed.